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INTRODUCTION 
In POST'S1 Brief, POST does not respond to, and therefore concedes, two (2) key 
issues raised in Mr. Benson's Appeal Brief dated May 28, 2010 (herein "Appeal Brief). 
First, that the June 9, 2008, POST Council Meeting Minutes ("POST Minutes") constitute 
the official record of the action taken by POST Council, as set forth in the Open Public 
Meeting Act, Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-203(7) (2008). See, Appeal Brief at p. 27-30, and 
Exhibit B to the Addendum attached hereto. Mr. Benson respectfully submits that the 
POST Minutes irrefutably establish that the POST Director's improper adoption, carte 
blanche, of Administrative Law Judge Luke's (herein "ALJ Luke") Findings of Fact, 
Conclusion of Law and Recommended Order ("ALJ Luke's Recommended Order") in the 
Final Order constitutes reversible error. 
The second key issue that POST fails to respond to, and therefore concedes, is that 
ALJ Luke made a critical error in her Order on Motion to Supplement the Hearing 
Record2 ("Supplementation Order"). ALJ Luke supplemented the hearing transcript 
under the section captioned "cross-examination," as follows: "he [Mr. Benson] testified 
that he gave POST the letter from Lyle Lucey [sic] because POST wanted something 
from the Department of Corrections ("DOC") not him to verify his reserve status." R. 
1. All references herein to the Respondent shall, for convenience, be identified as 
"POST"). 
2. Briefing in this matter was preliminarily stayed to permit correction/supplementation 
of the record with the omitted portion of the transcript. R. 1102. The audio recording of 
the hearing before ALJ Luke malfunctioned necessitating supplementation of the record. 
Specifically, during direct examination of Mr. Benson, the audio recording malfunctioned 
such that the direct examination of Mr. Benson by Robert Morton is missing from the 
audio recording, however, the audio recording and the transcript fully contain Mr. 
Benson's "cross-examination" testimony. 
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1172. However, the audio recording (and transcript) contains the cross-examination of 
Mr. Benson and ALJ Luke's foregoing supplementation directly contradicts the transcript. 
Thus, ALJ Luke's Supplementation Order as to Mr. Benson's cross-examination 
testimony is, at best, superfluous and, in at least one material respect, inconsistent3 with 
the record testimony. ALJ Luke's mistaken belief that Mr. Benson testified he gave the 
Leo Lucey memo to POST, when in fact, Mr. Lucey, not Mr. Benson, gave the memo to 
POST sheds light on how ALJ Luke reached her erroneous finding and conclusion that 
Mr. Benson willfully submitted falsified evidence to POST. 
In POST'S Brief, POST also asks this Court to impose a double standard by 
relieving POST from the obligations set forth in its own administrative rules while at the 
same time upholding the "lapse" of Mr. Benson's POST certification4 based on Mr. 
Benson's alleged failure to follow the Department of Corrections internal rules.5 On two 
3. Mr. Benson's Appeal Brief demonstrates that the memorandum from Mr. Leo Lucey 
("the Leo Lucey memo") was irrefutably submitted to POST by Mr. Lucey, not Mr. 
Benson. See, Appeal Brief at pages 10, 11,40-43 and footnotes 11, 45-46. A copy of 
Mr. Lucey's memo is set forth in Exhibit C to Mr. Benson's Appeal Brief. 
4. Significantly, the POST Administrative Complaint in this matter did not seek to deny 
reactivation of Mr. Benson's certification by the statutory waiver examination. R. 396-
402. POST counsel's efforts to "boot strap" the POST Director's Final Order purporting 
to uphold the denial of Mr. Benson's POST certification by the statutory waiver 
examination is outside the scope of the Administrative Complaint and cannot be upheld. 
See, Palmer v. City of Monticello, 731 F.Supp. 1503, 1508 (D.Utah 1990) (holding action 
taken against peace officer's employment relating to charges outside the scope of the 
notice violated due process). 
5. The Utah Legislature has provided that violation of internal departmental rules shall 
not constitute a valid legal basis in which to refuse, suspend, revoke or otherwise alter a 
peace officer's certification, as follows: 
"(4) Denial, suspension, or revocation procedures may not be initiated by 
2 
(2) separate occasions POST asks this Court to issue an order determining that it does not 
need to follow its own administrative rules by: (i) alleging that POST Administrative 
Rule 728-409-20(A)(l) requiring the POST Director to prepare a final order outlining the 
POST Council's decision allegedly violates the governing statute; and/or (ii) ignoring the 
preponderance of the evidence burden of proof standard adopted by POST Council in 
Administrative Rule 728-409-7(4)(c). POST should not be permitted to challenge the 
validity of its own rules for the first time on appeal because this issue is outside the scope 
of the issues presented in Mr. Benson's Appeal Brief, has not been raised/preserved by 
POST in the record below, and POST has failed to file a cross-appeal. See, 438 Main 
Street v. Easy Heat,Inc, 2004 UT 72, f 50-51, 99 P.3d 801; McBride v. Carter, 784 P.2d 
141, 142 at fn. 2 (Utah 1989); Bluth v. Tax Cornm'n, 2001 UT App 138, 20 P.3d 882 
(although UAPA governs judicial review of administrative decisions, it does not govern 
judicial review of agency rules). 
Finally, throughout POST'S Brief, it repeatedly argues that Mr. Benson willfully 
provided misleading information to POST. However, at no point has, or can, POST point 
to a single shred of evidence that Mr. Benson provided any written documentation to 
POST that was false or misleading - in fact the only such documentation that was ever 
raised or argued below was the Leo Lucey memo which was clearly and unequivocally 
the council when an officer is terminated for infraction of his agency's 
policies, general orders, or similar guidelines of operation that do not 
amount to any of the causes for denial suspension, or revocation 
enumerated in Subsection (1)." Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211 (1998) 
(Emphasis supplied). 
Accord, POST Administrative Rule 728-409-4(B). 
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provided to POST by Mr. Lucey, not Mr. Benson.6 Further, the only statement that was 
allegedly made by Mr. Benson to be misleading was the statement to Jayme Gam, POST 
Technician, that [Mr. Benson] believed he was a reserve officer,7 not ithat he was in fact a 
reserve officer. See, Appeal Brief at p. 16, fh. 15, p. 21-22; R. 737 at p. 27-29. 
6. See, Introduction at p. 1-2 hereinabove. 
7. POST did not call Jayme Garn to testify - thus the only record and non-hearsay 
evidence/testimony regarding what Mr. Benson orally represented to POST is Mr. 
Benson's unremitted testimony. Mr. Benson respectfully submits that it constitutes a 
violation of the residuum rule for the critical finding to rely solely on inadmissible 
hearsay evidence when there is uncontroverted testimony to the contrary. This may be, 
perhaps, why ALJ Luke's findings of fact are bereft of any finding that Mr. Benson 
willfully made any false statement to Ms. Garn, or POST. 
This Court has made the following observations about the application of the residuum 
rule to agency decisions: 
"Under the residuum rule, all hearsay and other legally inadmissible 
evidence admitted by an agency is set aside by the reviewing court. There 
must then remain some "residuum of legal evidence competent in a court of 
law/' to support the agency's findings and conclusions of law. Yacht Club 
v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984). If 
there is not a residuum of legally competent evidence remaining, the agency 
action is reversed. Compare Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall, 636 P.2d 481, 
486 (Utah 1981) (residuum found after hearsay evidence was set aside) with 
Williams v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1354, 1357 (Utah App. 1987) (no 
residuum found after inadmissible evidence was set aside). 
... It would be arbitrary and capricious for the CSC to base its decision upon 
factual findings that are not supportable by legally competent evidence." 
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 32 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) 
(emphasis supplied). 
See also, Prosper, Inc. v. Dep't of Workforce Services, 2007 UT App 281,110-11, 
168 P.3d 344 (holding findings of fact cannot be based exclusively on inadmissible 
hearsay evidence). 
4 
I 
POST IS ESTOPPED FROM REFUSING 
MR, BENSON'S CERTIFICATION 
POST alleges Mr. Benson is not entitled to equitable relief because Mr. Benson 
allegedly has unclean hands. POST'S unclean hands argument should not be well taken 
because the only way Mr. Benson could be found to have unclean hands is if there was a 
finding by the POST Council (not the POST Director)8 that Mr. Benson "willfully 
provided false information to POST,"9 which the POST Council did not find. R. 397, 
745-757, 799-800. 
Contrary to POST'S argument, Mr. Benson relied on POST'S notification that he 
was certifiable (Jayme Gam's letter dated October 3, 2005), as well as subsequent 
notification from Lt. Jim Keith in 2005 that it was unnecessary for Mr. Benson to take the 
8. See, Argument II hereinbelow. 
9. POST takes inconsistent positions by arguing Mr. Benson engaged in willful 
falsification in response to Mr. Benson's arguments I, II, IV, and V, and then in argument 
III arguing Mr. Benson's certification simply lapsed because he was not serving as a 
reserve officer over a four (4) year time period. If, however, Mr. Benson's certification 
merely lapsed as POST avers in response to Mr. Benson's disparate treatment claim vis-a-
vis Mr. Lucey, then Mr. Benson is entitled to the equitable relief he requests. In POST'S 
Argument III, POST attempts to distinguish Mr. Benson and Mr. Lucey on the basis that 
Mr. Benson's certification merely lapsed while Mr. Lucey provided false and misleading 
information to POST. See, POST'S Brief at p. 15. POST cannot have it both ways - if the 
POST Council determined that Mr. Benson provided false information to POST (which Mr. 
Benson vigorously disputes) then Mr. Benson and Mr. Lucey are similarly situated for 
purposes of disparate treatment analysis. 
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statutory waiver examination. R. 737 at p. 195-203; R. 476. Mr. Benson also relied on 
POST'S issuance of his Peace Officer Certification, otherwise he would have taken the 
statutory waiver examination at that time.11 
II 
POST DIRECTOR STEPHENSON'S FINAL ORDER 
FAILS TO PROPERLY OUTLINE THE POST 
COUNCIL'S DECISION IN VIOLATION OF 
STATUTE AND POST ADMINISTRATIVE RULE 
A, The POST Council Determined that Mr, Benson's Certification Lapsed and 
Nothing More, 
As previously noted in the Introduction at page one (1) hereinabove, POST'S Brief 
does not dispute that the POST Minutes are controlling. The POST Minutes dated June 9, 
2008, reflect that the only motion made and voted on regarding Mr. Benson was "to 
accept the Administrative Law Judge's recommendation that Ronald Benson's peace 
officer certification lapsed in January 1, 2004." R. 757. See, Exhibit A attached to the 
10. Mr. Benson first applied to take the statutory waiver examination in an effort to clear 
up any issue regarding his peace officer certification in 2005. In 2005, then POST In-
Service Director, Lieutenant Jim Keith informed Mr. Benson that taking the statutory 
waiver examination was unnecessary and that all that he needed to do was submit ten (10) 
hours of training credit to POST and his certification would be reactivated. R. 737 at p. 
195-203; R. 476. Mr. Benson promptly complied with Lieutenant Keith's directive and 
Letisha Shelby, POST technician, at Lieutenant Keith's direction in a letter dated April 26, 
2005, reactivated Mr. Benson's certification. R. 737 at p. 195-203; R. 476, 540, 686-689. 
11. Scott Carver, then Executive Director of the DOC, included in his response to the 
Legislative Audit that Mr. Benson had indicated he was willing, at all times, to take the 
statutory waiver examination. R. 669. Mike Hanks also testified that Mr. Benson 
indicated he was willing to take the statutory waiver examination. R. 737 at p. 49. Mr. 
Benson also testified that he was willing to take the statutory waiver examination. R. 737 
at p. 288. 
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Addendum hereto. Thus, POST'S Brief misconstrues the POST Minutes by attempting to 
incorporate ALJ Luke's entire Recommended Order, as well as the director's alleged 
refusal to accept to reactivate Mr. Benson's peace officer certification by statutory waiver 
examination. POST Minutes, much like statutory construction, should be interpreted 
based on the plain language. See, State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993) 
(when construing questions of statutory construction, the court will first examine the plain 
language of the statute). 
In POST'S Brief at p. 13, POST takes a statement from Sheriff Bud Cox out of 
context and argues the POST Council accepted ALJ Luke's entire Recommended Order 
without alteration or change, including ALJ Luke upholding the Director's purported 
exercise of discretion requiring Mr. Benson to attend POST training to recertify. R. 326-
327. POST'S argument fails, however, because contrary to ALJ Luke's Recommended 
Order, during the June 9, 2008, POST Council meeting, the POST Council withdrew a 
motion which would require Mr. Benson to go through POST training as opposed to 
taking the statutory waiver examination.12 R. 738 at p. 50-52. 
In POST'S Brief at p. 12-13, POST also misconstrues Sheriff Cox's record 
comment as referencing ALJ Luke's Decision when in fact Sheriff Cox is referencing the 
12. During discussion after Sheriff Cox's motion passed, a second motion was made that 
Mr. Benson would need to attend POST training to recertify as opposed to taking the 
statutory/waiver examination - this second motion was withdrawn without vote. R. 738 
at 50-52. Although POST'S Brief relies on the transcript of the POST Council meeting 
(contained in R. 738), the POST Minutes not the transcript are controlling under Utah 
Code Ann. §52-4-203(7), as discussed in the Introduction at page 1 hereinabove. 
7 
POST Investigations Bureau Case Summary ("POST Case Summary"). See, POST'S 
Brief at p. 13. The direct quote from the transcript of the June 9, 2008, POST Council 
meeting reveals that Sheriff Cox is referring to the POST Case Summary, not to ALJ 
Luke's Recommended Order that POST refers to as follows: 
"The motion is merely what is stated on the action from POST 
investigations, and that - in fact, I read it, so that I wouldn't 
get it wrong." R. 738 at 47. 
The POST investigative action Sheriff Cox is referencing is included as a part of 
the POST Minutes.13 R. 799-800. Nowhere does the POST Case Summary recommend 
that ALJ Luke's entire Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order be 
adopted, in toto. The POST Case Summary consists of a two (2) page document that 
identifies two (2) allegations: falsification of information to obtain certified status and 
lapsed certification. The POST Case Summary also includes the following sections -
"Administrative Law Judge's Recommendation" (which only includes the lapse in 
certification, nothing more), "statutory violation" (which only includes Utah Code Ann. § 
53-6-208, lapsed certification), and "POST'S Recommendation" (a verbatim statement of 
Sheriff Cox's Motion).14 
13. The POST Minutes were previously included at Exhibit M to the Addendum to Brief 
of Appellant. For the Court's convenience, so that it may readily juxtapose the POST 
Minutes and Case Summaries for Mr. Benson and Chief Halliday, highlighted copies are 
attached hereto as Exhibits A. 
14. "POST recommends that the Council accept the ALJ's Ruling that Benson's 
certification lapsed on January 1, 2004." See, R. 738 at p. 46, 757 & 799. 
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The POST Case Summary for Mr. Benson included as an addendum to the POST 
Minutes only references the lapsing statute (Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-208) not the willful 
falsification statute (§53-6-211) as a basis for the POST action taken against Mr. Benson. 
Contrary to POST'S Brief at p. 12-13, the POST Council had a clear understanding of the 
difference between an action being taken regarding peace officer certification issues that 
involve mere lapsing of certification (i.e., Mr. Benson) versus willful falsification of 
information to obtain certification (i.e., Chief Halliday). That the POST Council intended 
to rely on the lapsing statute as the exclusive statutory basis for the action taken against 
Mr. Benson is demonstrated by comparing and juxtaposing the POST Case Summary for 
Mr. Benson with the POST Case Summary for Chief Michael Halliday ("Chief 
Halliday"), whose case was considered during the same POST Council meeting held on 
June 9, 2008. See, Exhibit A attached to the Addendum hereto. 
The POST Case Summary in Chief Halliday's case identifies the statutory basis of 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211(1 )(d)(i) - which is willful falsification of information to 
obtain certified status. R. 759, 801-802. In Chief Halliday's case, POST voted to impose 
a two (2) year suspension of Chief Halliday's peace officer certification for his willful 
falsification of information to obtain peace officer certification. R. 759, 801-802. Had 
the POST Council determined Mr. Benson had willfully falsified information to obtain 
peace officer status, the POST Council would most assuredly have imposed the same 
penalty (i.e., a two (2) year suspension) against Mr. Benson's peace officer certification 
that it imposed against Chief Halliday - to do otherwise is arbitrary and capricious 
9 
imposition of disparate treatment. R. 759, 756-757, 799-802. 
B. The POST Director Does Not Have Authority to Refuse, Sospend or Revoke 
Peace Officer Certification. 
The POST Director does not have the authority to issue a decision that Mr. 
Benson's peace officer certification lapsed without the POST Council's approval. In its 
Brief, POST erroneously argues the POST Council's general duties15 contained in §53-6-
107(l)(a)(ii) that "the council shall... advise the director..." somehow confers exclusive 
authority on the POST Director. POST conveniently ignores Utah Code Ann. §53-6-211 
(2008),16 which provides: 
"(l)(a) The director may, upon the concurrence of the 
majority of the council revoke, refuse, or suspend 
certification of a peace officer for cause..." Id. (emphasis 
supplied) 
Nowhere does the plain language of either §53-6-211 or §53-6-107 authorize the 
POST Director to take action against a peace officer certification absent concurrence of a 
majority vote of the POST Council. Pursuant to POST'S authority to promulgate rules, 
POST adopted Administrative Rule 728-409-20(1), as follows: 
"R728-409-20. Director's Final Order. 
A. In adjudicative proceedings: 
1. After a majority of the council recommends to refuse, 
suspend or revoke respondent's peace officer, correctional 
15. The heading to §53-6-107 is captioned "General Duties of Council." 
16. A classic rule of statutory construction is that specific provisions prevail over more 
general expressions. Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 244 (Utah 1980). 
The specific statutory provision that the POST Director may take action with the 
concurrence of POST Council contained in §53-6-211 (2008) is certainly more specific 
than the "General Duties of Council" contained in § 53-6-107. 
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officer, reserve/auxiliary officer, or special function officer 
certification, or to take no action against respondent, the 
director shall prepare and issue a final order within 30 days 
outlining the council's decision. 
2. The final order will include information on the appeal 
process as outlined in administrative rules R728-409-21, 22, 23. 
3. The director shall upon issuance, serve a copy of the 
final order on the respondent and the employing agency by 
certified mail." (Emphasis supplied) 
It is well established case law that an agency is bound by its own rules, to-wit: 
"'[Administrative regulations are presumed to be reasonable 
and valid and cannot be ignored or followed by the agency to 
suit its own purposes. Such is the essence of arbitrary and 
capricious action/ State ex rel Dep't of Community Affairs v. 
Utah Merit Sys. Council, 614P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah 1980). 
By ignoring its own rules, UDOT acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously." R.O.A. General v. Dep't of Transp., 966 P.2d 
840, 842 (Utah 1998). 
Despite the well established case law that an Agency's failure to follow its own rules 
constitutes an arbitrary and capricious action, POST asks this Court to determine that its 
own Administrative Rule 728-409-20(1) is inconsistent with Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211 
(1998) and therefore should not be enforced against it. Administrative Rule 728-409-
20(1)(2008) authorizing the Director to issue the final order outlining the decision 
recommended by the POST Council majority is consistent with the plain language set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-21 l(l)(a) (1998) which permits the Director to revoke, refuse or 
suspend peace officer certification for cause only upon the concurrence of the majority of 
the council. Further, recent legislation confirms POST Rule 728-409-20(1) is consistent 
11 
with the legislature's intent to authorize POST Council to take action against a peace 
officer's certification.18 See, Exhibit D attached to the Addendum hereto. 
Ill 
POST'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED 
BECAUSE MR. BENSON'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
WAS VIOLATED WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON 
MR. BENSON'S DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIM 
VIS-A-VIS LEO LUCEY 
As previously noted, POST'S argument in response to Mr. Benson's disparate 
treatment claim is inconsistent with its position in arguments I, II, IV & V. See, footnote 
9 hereinabove. POST takes the position that Mr. Benson's circumstance is not 
comparable to Mr. Lucey because Mr. Lucey allegedly provided false and misleading 
information to POST for the benefit of Mr. Benson,19 while Mr. Benson's peace offer 
certification simply lapsed after four (4) years of inactivity, to-wit: 
"Benson's certification was refused because he was found not 
to have served as a reserve peace officer during the four years 
17. The current version of §53-6-211(1) provides that: 
'The council has authority to suspend or revoke the certification of a peace 
officer... " Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211(1) (2010) (as amended) (emphasis 
supplied). 
18. Statutory amendments clarifying a prior statute will be accepted as the legislative 
declaration of the original act. In re D.B. v. State of Utah, 925 P.2d 178 (Utah Ct.App. 
1996). 
19. It appears that Mr. Lucey's circumstance is virtually identical to Chief Halliday who 
suffered a two (2) year suspension for willful falsification of information to obtain 
certification. The notion that Mr. Lucey experienced no sanction demonstrates that POST 
acted in an inconsistent fashion vis-a-vis the circumstances regarding Mr. Benson and 
Chief Halliday. See, Argument at p. 8-9 hereinabove. 
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he was out of law enforcement as he had claimed. There is no 
claim that Lucey was erroneously certified when he had not 
actually been serving as a peace officer. At most he could be 
accused of providing false or misleading information 
concerning whether or not Benson had been a peace officer. 
There is no showing that Benson and Lucey are similarly 
situated." See, POST'S Brief at p. 15.20 
Neither ALJ Luke, the POST Council, nor the POST Director issued any finding 
or made any conclusion that Mr. Benson and Mr. Lucey are not similarly situated. The 
only written evidence in this matter that was allegedly false or misleading was the Leo 
Lucey memo, however, no action has been taken by POST against Mr. Lucey's peace 
officer certification. Thus, Mr. Benson properly raised the disparate treatment claim 
which has never been ruled upon in violation of Mr. Benson's due process rights as 
previously held by this Court in Lunnen v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 886 P.2d 70 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1994) and Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 32 (Utah Ct.App. 
1991). 
Since Mr. Lucey authored and provided the Leo Lucey memo to POST, and the 
Leo Lucey memo is what POST has relied on as the lynchpin evidence to demonstrate 
willful falsification of information in this matter,21 Mr. Lucey would have been complicit 
20. If POST wants to concede that Mr. Benson's certification merely lapsed, then 
POST'S Final Order should be reversed because there is no statutory basis to uphold the 
refusal of Mr. Benson's certification because the statute requires willful falsification -
something only Mr. Lucey can be accused of on the record of these proceedings. See, 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-21 l(l)(d) (1998). 
21. As previously noted, Mr. Benson submits the Leo Lucey memo is neither false or 
misleading. See, Appeal Brief at p. 43-48. 
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if his conduct involved willful falsification and is therefore similarly situated for the 
purpose of disparate treatment analysis. See, Huemiller v. Ogden Civil Service Comm'n, 
2004 UT App 375, <H 6, 7, 101 P.3d 394 (holding that peace officers who were found 
guilty of misconduct in the same internal affairs investigation were similarly situated for 
the purpose of disparate treatment analysis). POST'S position that it is fair and rational to 
treat Mr. Lucey and Mr. Benson differently on the basis that Mr. Benson's certification 
lapsed, and all that Mr. Lucey did was allegedly provide false or misleading information, 
is neither fair, rational, or consistent with POST'S practices. 
IV 
POST COUNCIL ACTED CONTRARY TO ITS 
PRIOR PRACTICE BY IGNORING MR. BENSON'S 
SUCCESSFUL PASSING OF THE STATUTORY 
WAIVER EXAMINATION 
POST abused its discretion by failing to accept Mr. Benson's successful passing of 
the statutory waiver examination as curing any certification deficiencies. The failure to 
rule on a party's legal argument constitutes an abuse of discretion and is a violation of 
due process. See, Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23., 32 (Utah Ct.App. 
1991). ALJ Luke's Recommended Order dated February 28, 2008, states that "the 
22. In Lt. Winward's Investigative report, he concludes that, 
"The issue of the falsification of documentation to obtain peace officer 
status is undetermined. Based on the information gathered and individuals I 
contacted it is difficult to determine if the memo produced by Leo Lucey in 
September of 2003 was done under false pretenses." R. 533. 
Clearly, POST was aware of Mr. Lucey's involvement, yet no action was taken against 
Mr. Lucey's certification. 
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Director of POST has refused reinstatement by waiver exam," is not supported by any 
record evidence/testimony nor any written decision from the POST Director prior to ALJ 
Luke's Recommended Order. In POST'S Final Order dated June 11, 2008, a written 
order issued by POST Director Stephenson, he avers that: 
"POST Council affirms and adopts the Administrative Law 
Judge's Recommendation and Order that the Director's 
refusal to reinstate the certification by waiver examination 
was within his authority, discretion and was appropriate." R. 
387. 
The Final Order is made almost four (4) months after ALJ Luke's Recommended 
Order, thus begs the question - how can ALJ Luke make a recommendation upholding 
the POST Director's decision when there is no record evidence demonstrating that the 
decision was ever made?23 POST Director Stephenson, writes the Final Order in the 
third person as if the Director already made the refusal to reinstate by waiver 
examination, however no such written decision was ever received or has been introduced 
in the proceedings below.24 POST Council's efforts to boot strap POST Director 
23. Richard Townsend was the Director of POST at the time of the initiation of the POST 
investigation (January 2006) and the issuance of the Administrative Complaint (May 2006). 
R. 527, 394, 399. There was a change in the director by the time of the Final Order was 
issued in June of 2006, to POST Director Scott Stephenson. R. 745; 386-387. 
24. Specifically, POST Director Stephenson's Final Order also claims that a "key issue" 
in the POST Administrative Complaint was whether the Director of POST properly 
exercised his authority and discretion in denying Mr. Benson's request to recertify by the 
statutory waiver examination, yet another statement not supported by the record. R. 386. 
However, nowhere in POST'S Administrative Complaint is there an allegation that the 
POST Director has exercised his discretion to accept Mr. Benson's successful passing of 
the statutory waiver examination. R. 396-402. 
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Stephenson's purported exercise of discretion that was never presented in the proceeding 
before ALJ Luke is, by definition, arbitrary and capricious. Further, POST'S attempt to 
distinguish Mr. Benson and Mike Hanks (the peace officer who was permitted to 
recertify by statutory waiver examination after a seven (7) year lapse), fails because 
POST did not find Mr. Benson engaged in willful submission of falsification information 
to POST. See, Argument Sections 2 & 5 herein. 
V 
POST'S FINAL ORDER IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
A, POST Should not be Permitted to Abandon the Preponderance of the 
Evidence Burden of Proof Standard Adopted Under POST Administrative 
Rules, 
POST is asking this Court to repudiate the preponderance of the evidence burden 
of proof standard adopted by POST'S own administrative rule as somehow conflicting 
with the substantial evidence standard of review contained in Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act ("UAPA") at §63G-4-403(4)(g).26 POST'S argument should not be well 
taken because our appellate courts have previously held it is the essence of an arbitrary 
and capricious action for an agency to disregard its own rules. See, R.O.A, General v. 
UtahDep'tofTransp., 966 P.2d 840 (Utah 1998), Dep't of Community Affairs v. Utah 
25. POST Administrative Rule 728-409-7(c) (2008). See, Exhibit Z attached to Mr. 
Benson's Appeal Brief. 
26. This Court also has the authority to reverse POST'S Final Order under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63G-4-403(h)(ii) because POST'S failure to carry its burden of proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence is in violation of POST'S Administrative Rule 728-409-
7(c) (2008). See, Exhibit W to Addendum to Appeal Brief. 
16 
Merit System Council 614 P.2d 1259 (Utah 1980); see also. Brown v. United States, 377 
F.Supp. 530, 539 (N.D. Texas 1974) ("It is basic due process that the Government cannot 
set up regulations and then disregard them"). 
POST'S adoption of a higher burden of proof standard conforms with the minimum 
97 98 
requirements of UAPA and is therefore consistent with its legislative design. In the 
2010 Legislative Session, the Utah Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211, by 
adopting the "clear and convincing" burden of proof standard on POST in proceedings 
regarding a peace officer's certification while retaining the existing preponderance of 
evidence standard as to a peace officer's burden as to proving an affirmative defense. 
27. UAPA does not preclude the adoption of rules in conformity with UAPA, to-wit: 
"(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from enacting a rule 
affecting or governing an adjudicative proceeding or from following the 
rule, if the rule is enacted according to the procedures outlined in Title 63G, 
Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, and if the rule conforms 
to the requirements of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-102(6) 
(2008) (emphasis supplied). 
So long as POST does not adopt a lower burden of proof, a higher standard would 
remain in conformity with the minimum requirements set forth in UAPA. 
28. POST'S reliance on Draughon v. Utah Dep't of Financial Institutions, 1999 UT App 
42, 975 P.2d 935, is misplaced. Draughon stands for the proposition that an agency's rule 
that conflicts with its organic statute is invalid. Draughon involved the Department of 
Human Resource Management's ("DHRM") adoption of rules under the DHRM statute, 
drawing a distinction between a "demotion" and an "involuntary reassignment" on the 
basis of immediate loss of pay. The Court held the distinction was illusory and therefore 
invalid. POST does not claim that it did not have authority to enact Administrative Rule 
728-409-7(c) or that this rule is inconsistent with its organic statute but only that this rule 
conflicts with a separate statute, UAPA, and is therefore invalid. Since Administrative 
Rule 728-409-7(c) is consistent with the Legislative design of UAPA, Draughon does not 
support POST'S argument. 
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See, Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-21 l(3)(d)(i) & (ii) (2010).29 POST'S argument that the 
preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, under the former statute, is inconsistent 
with the legislative design must fail because the Utah Legislature has adopted an even 
higher burden of proof than is contained in POST's administrative rules (and UAPA). 
Mr. Benson respectfully submits that under either standard of review,30 he has 
properly marshaled the evidence and the challenged findings of "willful submission of 
falsified instruction" and the POST Director's denial of Mr. Benson's certification by 
statutory waiver examination are not supported by the record evidence. 
B. Mr. Benson Properly Marshaled the Evidence Warranting Reversal of the 
POST Final Order. 
POST's Brief suggests that Mr. Benson did not properly marshal the evidence. At 
page 35 in his Appeal Brief, Mr. Benson clearly identified the two (2) challenged findings 
as follows: 
"POST failed to present sufficient evidence to prove upon a 
preponderance of the evidence that (1) Mr. Benson willfully 
submitted falsified information to obtain peace officer 
29. See, Exhibit D to the Addendum attached hereto. 
30. Under the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, the party bearing the burden of 
proof must "demonstrate that its existence is more likely than not." See, Harken 
Southwest Corp. v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1182 (Utah 1996). 
Under the standard substantial evidence standard of review, evidence, by definition, is not 
substantial if it (1) is based on mere conclusions; (2) is contrary to the overwhelming 
evidence presented at the hearing; or (3) runs afoul of the residuum rule. See, A.M.L. v. 
Dep't of Health, 863 P.2d 44,47 (Utah Ct.App. 1993) (finding evidence is not substantial 
if it is overwhelmed by other evidence or based on mere conclusions); Lucas v. Murray 
City Civil Service Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746, 758 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also, footnote 7, 
hereinabove. 
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certification and (2) the POST Director improperly exercised 
his discretion to deny Mr. Benson's certification by statutory 
waiver examination." Appeal Brief at p. 35. 
It is clear that Mr. Benson has challenged findings of fact numbered 16 & 17.31 
Finding of fact no. 16 provides, in part: 
"In obtaining and submitting the letter to POST in an effort to 
counter a finding that his certification had lapsed he [Mr. 
Benson] willfully submitted falsified information to POST to 
obtain certified status." R. 326. 
Mr. Benson argued that the finding of willful falsification is not supported by the 
record because there is no evidence that he willfully submitted any false information to 
POST.32 See, Appeal Brief at p. 36-48. Clearly, Mr. Benson has challenged finding 
number 16. 
Without citation to the record contrary to Rule 24(a)(7) Ut.R.App.P., POST 
continuously maintains that because Mr. Benson represented to POST that he served as a 
31. POST's Brief makes issue of the fact that in marshaling the evidence, Mr. Benson 
does not identify the findings of fact he is disputing by number. POST'S Brief does not 
provide a citation to any appellate rule or appellate decision from this Court, other legal 
authority requiring the challenged facts to be identified by number. Mr. Benson 
respectfully submits that the facts he is challenging are clearly identified and are 
appropriately marshaled in his Appeal Brief. 
32. For example, the Jayme Gam letter of October 1, 2003, in response to the Leo Lucey 
memo, merely indicated that Mr. Benson was certifiable as of that date. R. 475. 
Inasmuch as Mr. Benson had been out of active employment in the law enforcement field 
for less than four (4) years at that time, Mr. Benson was certifiable regardless of whether 
the Leo Lucey memo was received. Had POST actually relied on the Leo Lucey memo to 
establish that Mr. Benson was in fact a reserve officer, Ms. Garn's letter would have said 
that Mr. Benson was fully certified - not merely certifiable. 
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reserve peace officer,33 this somehow supports a finding of willful falsification of records 
and constitutes a valid legal basis in which to refuse his certification by statutory waiver 
examination. See, Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 
1978) (holding our appellate courts need not consider any facts not properly cited to or 
supported by the record). ALJ Luke did not make a finding that Mr. Etenson represented 
to POST that he was, in fact, a reserve peace officer.34 Further, the only written evidence 
containing any allegedly falsified information submitted to POST was the Leo Lucey 
memo. However, Mr. Benson did not write the Leo Lucey memo and did not provide the 
Leo Lucey memo to POST. Thus, Mr. Benson did not provide any information to POST 
that could possibly support a finding of willfully submitting falsified information by 
either substantial evidence or a preponderance of the evidence.35 
33. See, POST'S Brief at p. 8,9, 17&20. 
34. Our appellate courts have previously held that an agency's failure to make a 
necessary finding is arbitrary and capricious: 
"[T]he failure of an agency to make adequate findings of fact in material 
issues renders its findings "arbitrary and capricious " unless the evidence is 
"clear and uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion. Id. at 4-5 
(quoting Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm% 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 1990) 
(citations omitted), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991)). We may not, 
however, assume that an undisclosed finding was in fact made. Id. at 5. 
The party defending the agency's action bears the burden of showing that 
the undisclosed finding was actually made. Id." Hidden Valley Const. Co., 
v. Utah Board of Oil Gas & Mining, 866 P.2d 564, 568 (Utah Ct.App. 
1993). 
35. It is important to note that there have not been any allegations that Mr. Benson lied 
under oath or did not tell the truth under garrity warning in this matter. Upon presentation 
of the Department of Corrections internal reserve officer policy, Mr. Benson consistently 
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Finding of fact number 17 provides, in part: 
"Mr. Benson has passed the test but the Director of POST has 
refused to recertify him without readmission and graduation 
from the POST academy." R. 326. 
Mr. Benson marshaled the evidence and demonstrated that there was no record 
evidence presented to ALJ Luke that the POST Director made any determination and/or 
formally denied Mr. Benson's certification36 incident to his successful passing of the 
statutory waiver examination prior to ALJ Luke's Recommended Order issued on 
February 28, 2008. See, Appeal Brief at p. 48-50. Clearly Mr. Benson has challenged 
finding number 17. 
testified under oath and garrity warning, that although he previously believed he was a 
reserve officer, in hindsight he admitted he did not follow the Department's internal 
reserve officer policy to the letter. See, Appeal Brief at p. 45-48. In any event, this is 
insufficient evidence to uphold a finding of willfulness under either the substantial 
evidence or preponderance of the evidence standard. 
36. Lt. Winward's testimony that Mr. Benson's certification by waiver examination was 
"in essence" denied constitutes inadmissible hearsay evidence in violation of the 
residuum rule because no written documentation was presented and the POST Director 
was not called to testify. See, footnote 7 hereinabove. 
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CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Mr. Benson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the POST Final Order and 
order POST to reinstate Mr. Benson's peace officer certification, effective March 4, 2004. 
DATED this _ J day of fchW , 2010. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DYER LAW GROUP PLLC 
PhillipAV. Dfyer, Esq. 
Carey A. Seager, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellant Ron Benson 
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INDEX TO ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A: Minutes of June 9, 2008, POST Council Meeting 
re: Ron Benson and Chief Halliday 
EXHIBIT B: Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-102 & § 52-4-203 (2008) 
EXHIBIT C: Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211 (1998) 
EXHIBIT D: Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211 (2010) 
Tab A 
MINUTES OF JUNE 9,2008 
POST MEETING RE: 
1. Ronald W. Benson 
2. Chief Michael Halliday 
Motion: Robby Robertson motioned to accept Jeremy Davenport's signed consent 
agreement for a four-year suspension of his Peace Officer Certification. 
(6/9/2008 - 6/9/2008) 
Second; Ben Jones seconded the motion. 
Vote; The motion passed with all in favor. 
MICHAEL JOHNSON - (Inappropriate use of technology) 
•Appendix A-18 
Aggravating Circumstances; On-duty; Willingness to participate in conduct; Supervisory 
authority; Repetitiveness of conduct. 
Mitigating Circumstances: None. 
Motion; Sheriff Dave Edmunds motioned to accept Michael Johnson's signed 
consent agreement for a two-year suspension of his Peace Officer 
Certification. (6/9/2008-6/9/2008) 
Second; Sheriff Mike Lacy seconded the motion. 
Vote: The motion passed with all in favor. 
RONALD W. BENSON - (Falsification of information to obtain certified status, Lapsed 
certification) 
*AppendixA-19 
I Aggravating Circumstances: None. 
[ Mitigating Circumstances: None. 
Attorney Robert Morton informed the Council Ron Benson and his Counsel were present to 
appeal the Administrative Law Judge's ruling. Atty. Morton gave a brief summary of the case 
and told the Council the allegations in this case were: Falsification of information to obtain 
certified status and a lapsed certification. 
The ALJ's findings were that during a four-year period (January 2000 - March 2004): 1) Benson 
was not engaged in performing the duties of a law enforcement officer and as such his 
certification had lapsed and is subject to the provision of Utah Code Annotated 53-6-208 which 
requires him to go back threw the academy to attain certification. 2) Benson submitted falsified 
documents to POST. 
Atty. Morton requested POST Council to uphold the ALJ ruling and require Benson to go 
through the academy if he is to work as a peace officer. 
Attorney Phil Dyer, representing Ron Benson, addressed the Council Atty. Dyer presented a 
rebuttal to the AJL's ruling and requested the Council to rescind the ALJ's decision and 
exonerate Benson through no action. Atty. Dyer would like the ALJ ruling expunged from Mr. 
i ? 
Benson's file if the Council grants Benson's the appeal. 
There was discussion held by Council members on the topic of reserve officer status and UDC 
reserve officer policy. Bud Cox expressed concern about Benson having worked for a couple of 
years in a certified position before this information was discovered. After reading the ALJrs 
findings and facts he made the following motion. 
Motion: Sheriff Bud Cox motioned to accept the Administrative Law Judge's 
recommendation that Ronald Benson's peace officer certification lapsed in 
January 1, 2004. 
Second: Sheriff Mike Lacy seconded the motion. 
Vote: The motion passed with 9 in favor and 1 against (Deputy Director Mike 
Haddon recused himself from voting on this motion.) 
Request for Reconsideration: 
GEORGE ZAMANTAKIS - (Sexual Misconduct, Lying under Garrity) 
Zamantakis' Attorney, Matt Jube, addressed the Council. He indicated Zamantakis does not 
feel his action's should go undisciplined, but feels a suspension is more appropriate over 
revocation. According to the guidelines, the sexual misconduct offense is a category uDn offence 
with a two-year baseline suspension and lying under Garrity is a category UC offence with a 
three-year baseline suspension. Counsel Jube also listed several factors he felt should be 
included as mitigators for this case: 
• First offence 
• Public support 
• FBI letter 
• Letter from mayor 
• Agency support 
Zamantakis denies having sexual relations at his home or at the work place. He took 
responsibility and resigned from his position. Counsel Jube requested a suspension of his 
peace officer certification in lieu of revocation. 
George Zamantakis addressed the Council and stated he owes the Council and LL Winward an 
apology for his actions. He worked very hard to become a chief and worked hard for his 
officers. He has since made his family the priority in his life. His wife Misty Zamantakis 
addressed the Council in support of her husband. 
Guy Mills the former husband of the employee Zamantakis had the affair with, addressed the 
Council. He testified before the Council that Zamantakis lied to him for years about the affair 
and tried to convince his ex-wife to lie about the relationship. He feels Zamantakis should never 
return to law enforcement. 
Counsel Jube re-approached the Council and stated Zamantakis has the support of the 
community and is assisting the new chief with his duties. 
Bud Cox asked if any facts of the case have changed since last POST Council meeting when 
this case was first heard. LL Winward indicated the facts of the case have not changed and 
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MICHAEL HALLIDAY - (False Information to Obtain Peace Officer Certification) 
*Appendix A-20 
Aggravating Circumstances: Position of Authority. 
Mitigating Circumstances: None. 
Counsel Morton informed the POST Council this case was previously heard and ruled on by an 
ALJ. InitiaHy Halliday-was going to appeal the ALTs ruling in person, but has encountered 
health problems precluding him from appearing before the Council. He has requested in a letter 
for POST Council not to suspend his Peace Officer Certification. Via written correspondence, 
his Counsel asked the press to use discretion in light of Hallida/s current health problems. 
Based on the fact of the case the ALJ recommends a two-year suspension. 
Dave Edmunds stated POST must be able to rely on chief executives to accurately report 
training hours to ensure the integrity of their departments' reserve program. When a 
department reports training hours for a program that doesn't even exist POST Council needs to 
take swift and sever action. 
Motion: Sheriff Dave Edmunds motioned to revoke Michael Halliday's Peace Officer 
Certification. 
Second; Deputy Director Mike Haddon seconded the motion. 
Discussion: Donna Dillingham-Evans stated this was poor administration, poor judgment* and 
poor interpretation. But the chief did not gain anything by doing this. So what 
was his reason for falsifying the documentation? Scott Stephenson stated the 
certification is valuable because it enables them to-come back to the profession 
in the future. 
Scott Stephenson emphasized POST does not have the resources to police 
every reserve officer program in the state. When Holladay reported 40 hours for 
an officer that lived on the Wasatch front ft raised serious concerns and 
questions at POST. 
Chairman Nelson stated retirees have asked him to place them on his 
department's reserve roster. However, once they realize the work requirements, 
they change their minds. There are three requirements to be a reserve off icer 1 -
be on a roster, 2- be engaged in faw enforcement duties and 3- complete 40 
hours of in-service training. Mike Larsen stated, retired officers listed on his 
reserve roster work at his discretion in the capacity that supports his department 
He would hate to see POST restrict the usage of a reserve program. Dave 
Edmunds does not think POST or the Council wants to regulate the reserve 
program, he just feels when someone is found misrepresenting the program they 
should be disciplined. 
Sub-Motion: Chief Vaf Shupe motioned to accept the ALJ's recommendation for a two-
year suspension of Michael Hailiday's peace officer certification. 
Second: Robbie Robertson seconded the motion. 
Vote: The motion passed with 6 in favor and 4 against (Sheriff Lacy abstained) 
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POST INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU 
CASE SUMMARY RE: 
1. Ronald W. Benson 
2. Chief Michael Halliday 
From Appendix to June 9,2008 POST Minutes 
POST Investigations Bureau 
CASE SUMMARY 
Case No: 07-003LE 
Subject: Ronald W. Benson 
Investigator: Steven Winward 
ALLEGATIONS) 
Falsification of Information to Obtain Certified Status 
Lapsed Certification 
POST INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS 
Ronald W. Benson employed by the Salt Lake Comity Sheriffs Office as a correctional 
officer in April of 1978. In April of 1987 Ron Benson resigned employment at Salt Lake 
Cotmty and was hired by the Utah Department of Correction (UDC). During his time at 
UDC he attained his certification as a law enforcement officer. On November 2,199S, 
Benson retired from UDC and was hired by the Department of Insurance as a criminal 
investigator. On January 1,2000, Benson resigned from the Department of tisurance and 
sought employment in the private sector as a civilian. 
In the Fall of 2003, Benson contacted POST and requested his certification be reinstated. 
He provided POST with a letter from a supervisor at UDC that stated that he had a 
reserve application on file with corrections and submitted training hours for each year h e 
was ont of law enforcement Based upon the information provided by Benson^ POST 
updated his records. In March of 2004, UDC hired Benson as an Adult Probation and 
Parole Officer. 
In December 2006, the Legislative General Auditors Office conducted an audit on UDC. 
In the audit, Benson's Peace Officer Certification reactivation was called into question* 
The audit's inquiry into his certified status precipitated Benson to contact POST to 
reactivate his peace officer status. During the reactivation process, POST found 
inaccuracies in Ms application. As a result of the inaccuracies, POST opened an 
investigation. 
On January 19,2007> Benson was interviewed by POST. After being issued a Garrity 
warning, Benson stated he worked as a reserve officer by passing along information be 
received from informants. A letter provided by a UDC supervisor implied Benson was a 
reserye officer with UDC during the time be was out of law enforcement The POST 
investigation determined that he did not fimction as a reserve officer as outlined by UDC 
policies and procedures. 
In May 2007 an administrative complaint was filed against Benson. Benson, through his 
attorney Phil Dyer, responded to the complaint On December 18,2007, an 
administrative hearing was scheduled and held in front of Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) Cheryl Luke. 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE RECOMMENDATION 
On December 18,2007, ALJ Cheryl Luke heard administrative complaint against Ron 
Benson. 
On February 29,2008, ALJ Cheryl Luke ruled, "Mr. Benson was not engaged in the 
duties of a law enforcement officer from January 1, 2000 to March 2004. His 
certification lapsed and is subject to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 53-6-208." 
V I O L A T I O N S 
Benson's actions violated the following: 
I. Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-208 lapsed certification 
AGGRAVATING CIRCTJMSTANCEfS) 
None 
MITIGATING CERCUMSTANCEfS) 
None 
POST RECOMMENDATION 
POST recommends the Council accept the ALPs ruling that Benson's certification lapsed 
on January 1,2004. 
POST-COUNCIL ACTION 
FINAL ORDER 
POST Investigations Bureau 
CASE SUMMARY 
Case No: 07-039LE 
Subject: Michael Halliday 
Investigator: Steven Winward 
ALLEGATIONS) 
False Information To Obtain Peace Officer Certification 
POST INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS 
Michael Halliday was employed and certified as a deputy sheriff with San Juan County 
Sheriffs Office on May 21,1976. On September 1,1987, Blanding Police Department 
(BPD) hired Halliday and he was subsequently named as Chief of Police. 
In August 2007, Utah Highway Patrol (UHP) human resources contacted POST to obtain 
certification information on Danny Flannery whom they had hired POST discovered be 
had not worked in law enforcement for over three-years and did not have in-service 
training reported to POST during that time frame. F lanne l s UHP application included a 
letter from Chief Milce Halliday stating that Flannery was a BPD reserve officer and be 
maintained his training hours. However, Flannery did not list reserve work on his UHP 
application. His application reflected he was in Iraq working as a private contractor for 
approximately two years. POST determined the letter written by Halliday> on behalf of 
Flannery, was fabricated. POST opened an investigation on both parties. 
POST contacted Mayor Tom Turk of Blanding City to discuss the reserve program. 
Mayor Turk stated Blanding has never had an approved reserve program. Mayor Turk 
conducted an independent investigation and learned Chief Halliday was reporting hours 
for two officers who had quit the department Halliday reported in-service training hours 
to POST on behalf of two additional officers under the guise they were reserve officers 
for BPD. 
On August 14,2007, POST interviewed Halliday. Halliday stated he had a reserve 
program of former officers that he could call on for special events or special enforcement 
needs. Halliday admitted that the city administrators had not approved the reserve 
program. Halliday sold he thought he had the right, as the administrator, to have a 
reserve program setup in this fashion. 
POST reviewed the records of several officers named by Halliday. POST verified the 
officers named by Halliday, with the exception of one, did not work in any law 
enforcement capacity since leaving BPD. 
A-2Q 
An administrative complaint was sent out to Halliday seeking suspension of his Peace 
Officer Certification. Halhday responded to the complaint A hearing was scheduled in 
front of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) J. Richard Catten. 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE RECOMMENDATION 
On February 14,2008, a hearing was held to suspend the certification of Mike Halliday's 
Peace Officer Certification before the ALJ. The ALJ ruled Halliday violated the Law 
Enforcement Code of Ethics. ALJ Catten recommended Halliday^s Peace Officer 
Certification be suspended for two-years. 
VIOLATIONS) 
Halliday*s actions violated the following: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211 (I)(d)(i) williul falsification of any information to obtain 
certified status 
2. Administrative Code R728-409-3 (A) in that he violated the Law Enforcement Code of 
Ethics. 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
Position of Authority 
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
None 
POST RECOMMENDATION 
POST recommends the Council accept the recommendation of the ALJ and impose a two 
year suspension of Chief Halliday's Peace Officer CertificatiocL 
POST COUNCIL ACTION 
FINAL ORDER 
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PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
52-4-101. Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Open and Public Meetings 
Act." aoo* 
52-4-102. Declaration of public policy. 
(1) The Legislature finds and declares that the state, its 
agencies and political subdivisions, exist to aid in the conduct 
of the people's business. 
(2) It is the intent of the Legislature that the state, its 
agencies, and its political subdivisions: 
(a) take their actions openly; and 
(b) conduct their deliberations openly. 2006 
52-4-103. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Anchor location" means the physical location from 
which: 
(a) an electronic meeting originates; or 
(b) the participants are connected. 
(2) "Convening** means the calling of a meeting of a 
public body by a person authorized to do so for the express 
purpose of discussing or acting upon a subject over which 
that public body has jurisdiction or advisory power. 
(3) "Electronic meeting" means a public meeting con-
vened or conducted by means of a conference using 
electronic communications. 
(4) (a) "Meeting" means the convening of a public body, 
with a quorum present, including a workshop or an 
executive session whether the meeting is held in 
person or by means of electronic communications, for 
the purpose of discussing, receiving comments from* 
the public about, or acting upon a matter over which 
the public body has jurisdiction or advisory power. 
(b) "Meeting" does not mean: 
(i) a chance meeting; 
(ii) a social meeting; or 
(iii) the convening of a public body that has 
both legislative and executive responsibilities 
where no public funds are appropriated for ex-
penditure during the time the public body is 
convened and: 
(A) the public body is convened solely for 
the discussion or implementation of admin-
istrative or operational matters for which no 
formal action by the public body is required; 
or 
(B) the public body is convened solely for 
the discussion or implementation of admin-
istrative or operational matters that would 
not come before the public body for discus-
sion or action. 
(5) "Monitor" means to hear or observe, live, by audio 
or video equipment, all of the public statements of each 
member of the public body who is participating in a 
meeting. 
(6) "Participate" means the ability to communicate 
with all of the members of a public body, either verbally or 
electronically, so that each member of the public body can 
hear or observe the communication. 
(7) (a) "Public body" means any administrative, advi-
sory, executive, or legislative body of the state or its 
political subdivisions that: 
(i) is created by the Utah Constitution, stat-
ute, rule, ordinance, or resolution; 
(ii) consists of two or more persons; 
(iii) expends, disburses, or is supported in 
whole or in part by tax revenue; and 
(iv) is vested with the authority to make deci-
sions regarding the public's business, 
(b) ^Public body" does not include a: 
(i) political party, political group, or political 
caucus; or 
(ii) conference committee, rules committee, or 
sifting committee of the Legislature. 
(8) "Public statement? means a statement made in the 
ordinary course of business of the public body with the 
intent that all other members of the public body receive it. 
(0) (a) "Quorum" means a simple majority of the mem-
bership of a public body, unless otherwise defined by 
applicable law. 
(b) "Quorum" does not include a meeting of two 
elected officials by themselves when no action, either 
formal or informal, is taken on a subject over which 
these elected oflicials have advisory power. 
(10) "Recoixling" means an audio, or an audio and 
video, record of the proceedings of a meeting that can be 
used to review the proceedings of the meeting. 2007 
52-4-104. Training. 
The presiding officer of the public body shall ensure that the 
members of the public body are provided with annual training 
on the requirements of this chapter. 2006 
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(c) A public body is in compliance with the provisions of 
Subsection (3XaXn) by providing notice to a newspaper or 
local media correspondent under the provisions of Subsec-
tion 63F-l-701(4Xd). 
(4) A public body is encouraged to develop and use addi-
tional electronic means to provide notice of its meetings under 
Subsection (3). 
(5) (a) The notice requirement of Subsection (1) may be 
disregarded if: 
(i) because of unforeseen drcumstances it is nec-
essary for a public body to hold an emergency meet-
ing to consider matters of an emergency or urgent 
nature; and 
(ii) the public body gives the best notice practicable 
o£ 
(A) the time and place of the emergency meet-
ing, and 
(B) the topics to be considered at the emer-
gency meeting. 
(b) An emergency meeting of a public body may not be 
held unless: 
(i) an attempt has been made to notify all the 
members of the public body; and 
(ii) a majority of the members of the public body 
approve the meeting. 
(6) (a) A public notice that is required to include an agenda 
under Subsection (1) shall provide reasonable specificity 
to notify the public as to the topics to be considered at the 
meeting. Each topic shall be listed under an agenda item 
on the meeting agenda. 
(b) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (6Xc), and at 
the discretion of the presiding member of the public body 
a topic raised by the public may be discussed during an 
open meeting, even if the topic raised by the public was 
not included in the agenda or advance public notice for the 
meeting. 
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (5), relating to 
emergency meetings, a public body may not take final 
action on a topic in an open meeting unless the topic is: 
(i) listed under an agenda item as required by 
Subsection (6Xa); and 
(ii) included with the advance public notice re-
qnired by this section. 2008 
52-4-203. Minutes of open meetings — Public records 
— Recording of meetings. 
(1) Except as provided under Subsection (8), written min-
utes and a recording shall be kept of all open meetings. 
(2) Written minutes of an open meeting shall include: 
(a) the date, time, and place of the meeting; 
(b) the names of members present and absent; 
(c) the substance of all matters proposed, discussed, or 
decided by the public body which may include a summary 
of comments made by members of the public body; 
(d) a record, by individual member, of each vote taken 
by the public body; 
(e) the name of each person who is not a member of the 
public body, and upon recognition by the presiding mem-
ber of the public body, provided testimony or comments to 
the public body; 
(f) the substance, in brie£ of the testimony or com-
ments provided by the public under Subsection (2Xe); and 
(g) any other information that any member requests be 
entered in the minutes or recording. 
(3) A recording of an open meeting shallf 
(a) be a complete and unedited record of all open 
portions of the meeting from the commencement of the 
meeting through adjournment of the meeting; and 
(b) be properly labeled or identified with the date, time, 
and place of the meeting. 
(4) (a) The minutes and recordings of an open meeting are 
public records and shall be available within a reasonable 
time after the meeting. 
(b) An open meeting record kept only by a recording 
must be converted to written minutes within a reasonable 
time upon request. 
(5) All or any part of an open meeting may be indepen-
dently recorded by any person in attendance if the recording 
does not interfere with the conduct of the meeting. 
(6) Minutes or recordings of an open meeting that are 
required to be retained permanently shall be maintained in or 
converted to a format that meets long-term records storage 
requirements. 
(7) Written minutes and recordings of open meetings are 
public records under Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government 
Records Access and Management Act, but written minutes 
shall be the official record of action taken a t the meeting. 
(8) Either written minutes or a recording shall be kept of: 
(a) an open meeting that is a site visit or a traveling 
tour, if no vote or action is taken by the public body; and 
(b) an open meeting of a local district under Title 17B, 
limited Purpose Local Government Entities — Local 
Districts, or special service district under Title 17B, 
Chapter 1, Special Service District Act, if the districts 
annual budgeted expenditures for all funds, excluding 
capital expenditures and debt service, are $50,000 or less. 
2008 
52-4-204. Closed meeting held upon vote of members — 
Business — Reasons for meet ing recorded. 
(1) A closed meeting may be held: 
(a) if a quorum is present; and 
(b) if two-thirds of the members of the public body 
present at an open meeting for which notice is given 
under Section 52-4-202 vote to approve closing the meet-
ing. 
(2) A closed meeting is not allowed unless each matter 
discussed in the closed meeting is permitted under Section 
52-4-205. 
(3) An ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation, contract, or 
appointment may not be approved at a closed meeting. 
(4) The following information shall be publicly announced 
and entered on the minutes of the open meeting at which the 
closed meeting was approved: 
(a) the reason or reasons for holding the closed meet-
ing; 
(b) the location where the closed meeting will be held; 
and 
(c) the vote by name, of each member of the public body, 
either for or against the motion to hold the closed meet-
ing. 
(5) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require 
any meeting to be closed to the public. 2006 
52-4-205. Purposes of closed meetings. 
(1) A closed meeting described under Section 52-4-204 may 
only be held for: 
(a) discussion of the character, professional compe-
tence, or physical or mental health of an individual; 
(b) strategy sessions to discuss collective bargaining; 
(c) strategy sessions to discuss pending or reasonably 
imminent litigation; 
(d) strategy sessions to discuss the purchase, exchange, 
or lease of real property if public discussion of the trans-
action would: 
(i) disclose the appraisal or estimated value of the 
property under consideration; or 
(ii) prevent the public body from completing the 
transaction on the best possible terms; 
TabC 
53-6-211. Revocation, suspension, or refusal of certifi-
cation — Hearings — Grounds — Notice to 
employer — Reporting. 
(1) (a) The director may, upon the concurrence of the ma-
jority of the council, revoke, refuse, or suspend certifica-
tion of a peace officer for cause. 
(b) Except as provided under Subsection (6), the coun-
cil shall give the person or peace officer involved prior 
notice and an opportunity for a full hearing before the 
council. 
(c) The director, with the concurrence of the council, 
may by rule designate a presiding officer to represent the 
council in adjudicative proceedings or hearings before the 
council. 
(d) Any of the following constitute cause for action 
under Subsection (l)(a): 
(i) willful falsification of any information to obtain 
certified status; 
(ii) physical or mental disability affecting the em-
ployee's ability to perform his duties; 
(iii) addiction to or the unlawful sale, possession, 
or use of narcotics, drugs, or drug paraphernalia; 
(iv) conviction of a felony or any crime involving 
dishonesty, unlawful sexual conduct, physical vio-
lence, or driving under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs; or 
(v) any conduct or pattern of conduct that would 
tend to disrupt, diminish, or otherwise jeopardize 
public trust and fidelity in law enforcement. 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding any expungement statute or rule 
of any other jurisdiction, any conviction obtained in this 
state or other jurisdiction may be considered for purposes 
of this section. 
(b) In this section, "conviction" includes a conviction 
that has been expunged, dismissed, or treated in a similar 
manner to either of these procedures. 
(c) This provision applies to convictions entered both 
before and after April 25, 1988. 
(3) The director shall send notice to the governing body of 
the political subdivision employing the peace officer and shall 
receive information or comments concerning the peace officer 
from the governing body or the agency employing the officer 
before suspending or revoking that peace officer's certification. 
(4) Denial, suspension, or revocation procedures may not be 
initiated by the council when an officer is terminated for 
infraction of his agency's policies, general orders, or similar 
guidelines of operation that do not amount to any of the causes 
for denial, suspension, or revocation enumerated in Subsec-
tion (1). 
(5) (a) Ifermination of a peace officer, whether voluntary or 
involuntary, does not preclude revocation or subsequent 
denial of peace officer certification status by the council if 
the peace officer was terminated for any of the reas 
under Subsection (1). ^ 
(b) Employment by another agency, or reinstatement f 
a peace officer by his parent agency after terminati 
whether the termination was voluntary or involuntar^ 
does not preclude revocation or subsequent denial f 
peace officer certification status by the council if the t>ea 
officer was terminated for any of the reasons unde 
Subsection (1). 
(6) (a) When the cause for action is conviction of a felonv 
the proceedings prior to a recommendation shall be hm* 
ited to an informal review of written documentation bv 
the presiding officer. 
(b) If the presiding officer determines that the peace 
officer has been convicted of a felony, then the presiding 
officer shall recommend revocation. 
(c) The peace officer may request an informal hearing 
before the presiding officer solely to present evidence that 
there was no felony conviction. 
(d) At the conclusion of an informal hearing, the pre-
siding officer shall make a recommendation to the director 
and the council. 
(7) The chief, sheriff, or administrative officer of a law 
enforcement agency is required to report to Peace Officer 
Standards and Training all conduct of employees who are 
DeaCP flffifPrQ «<5 r»rmn*Hck/l i n QnKortnf!A« St\fJ\ - i . 
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63-6-211. Suspension or revocation of certification — 
Right to a hearing — Grounds — Notice to 
employer — Reporting. 
(1) The council has authority to suspend or revoke the 
certification of a peace officer, if the peace officer: 
(a) willfully falsifies any information to obtain certifi-
cation; 
(b) has any physical or mental disability affecting the 
peace officer's ability to perform duties; 
(c) is addicted to alcohol or any controlled substance, 
unless the peace officer reports the addiction to the 
employer and to the director as part of a departmental 
early intervention process; 
(d) engages in conduct which is a state or federal 
criminal offense, but not including a traffic offense that is 
a class C misdemeanor or infraction; 
(e) refuses to respond, or fails to respond truthfully, to 
questions after having been issued a warning issued 
based on Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); 
(f) engages in sexual conduct while on duty; or 
(g) is dismissed from the armed forces of the Unites 
States under dishonorable conditions. 
(2) The council may not suspend or revoke the certification 
°f a peace officer for a violation of a law enforcement agency's 
P°licies, general orders, or guidelines of operation that do not 
^ o u n t to a cause of action under Subsection (1). 
(3) (a) The division is responsible for investigating officers 
who are allegeo! to have engaged in conduct in violation of 
Subsection (1). 
(b) The division shall initiate all adjudicative proceed-
ings under this section by providing to the peace officer 
involved notice and an opportunity for a hearing before an 
administrative law judge. 
(c) All adjudicative proceedings under this section are 
civil actions, notwithstanding whether the issue in the 
adjudicative proceeding is a violation of statute that may 
be prosecuted criminally. 
(d) (i) The burden of proof on the division in an adju-
dicative proceeding under this section is by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
(ii) If a peace officer asserts an affirmative defense, 
the peace officer has the burden of proof to establish 
the affirmative defense by a preponderance oi me 
evidence. 
(e) If the administrative law judge issues findings of 
fact and conclusions of law stating there is sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that the officer engaged in con-
duct that is in violation of Subsection (1), the division 
shall present the finding and conclusions issued by the 
aobxunistrative law judge to the council. 
(f) The division shall notify the chief, sheriff, or admin-
istrative officer of the police agency which employs the 
involved peace officer of the investigation and shall pro-
vide any information or comments concerning the peace 
officer received from that agency regarding the peace 
officer to the council before a peace officer's certification 
may be suspended or revoked. 
(g) If the administrative law judge finds that there is 
insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the officer is in 
violation of Subsection (1), the administrative law judge 
shall dismiss the adjudicative proceeding. 
(4) (a) The council shall review the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and the information concerning th§ 
peace officer provided by the officer's employing agency 
and determine whether to suspend or revoke the officer's 
certification. 
(b) A member of the council shall recuse him or herself 
from consideration of an issue that is before the council if 
the council member: 
(i) has a personal bias for or against the officer; 
(ii) has a substantial pecuniary interest in th§ 
outcome of the proceeding and may gain or lose som§ 
benefit from the outcome; or 
(hi) employs, supervises, or works for the same law 
enforcement agency as the officer whose case is before 
the council. 
(5) (a) Termination of a peace officer, whether voluntary or 
involuntary, does not preclude suspension or revocation of 
a peace officer's certification by the council if the peac§ 
officer was terminated for any of the reasons under 
Subsection (1). 
(b) Employment by another agency, or reinstatement of 
a peace officer by the original employing agency after 
termination by that agency, whether the termination was 
voluntary or involuntary, does not preclude suspension or 
revocation of a peace officer's certification by the council if 
the peace officer was terminated for any of the reasons 
under Subsection (1). 
(6) A chief, sheriff, or administrative officer of a law enforce-
ment agency who is made aware of an allegation against a 
peace officer employed by that agency that involves conduct in 
violation of Subsection (1) shall investigate the allegation and 
report to the division if the allegation is found to be true. 
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